Introduction
While Net Capital Flows between capital exporting and capital importing countries grew substantially in the 1990s, peaking before the global financial crisis, Gross Capital Inflows and Outflows and have risen quite dramatically (see Fig. 1 ); particularly in Developing Economies. 1 This increase might well be related to deeper financial integration but the risks associated with Sudden Stops in capital flows may also have grown. 2 But Gross Inflows and Outflows may move in such a way to dampen the impact on Net Flows. The literature to date has looked at different and somewhat specific aspects of the movement of gross flows. The goal of this paper is to attempt a more systematic analysis. Indeed, we propose a new taxonomy of Sudden Stops encompassing all the logical combinations in the movements of Gross and Net flows. Employing this new taxonomy, we suggest that Sudden Stops of different types may have different impacts on macroeconomic variables.
More generally, the literature regarding cross-border capital flows has tended to focus on certain phenomena regarding Gross and Net Capital Flows with the particular emphasis arguably depending on the epoch. For example, in the 1980s there was considerable interest in "capital flight" from Developing Economies, or what has been termed more recently, Starts in Gross Capital Outflows"; see for example Cuddington (1986) and Dooley (1986) . In the 1990s and 2000s, the focus turned to "Sudden Stops", which were normally defined as an abrupt reversal in Net Flows. It was found that such a Sudden Stop, and the associated current account adjustment and real exchange rate depreciation, resulted frequently in a significant output loss for affected economies (see Calvo, 1998; Calvo et al., 2004 Calvo et al., , 2008 Guidotti et al., 2004; Cavallo and Frankel, 2008) and that the conditions that led to Sudden Stops being more disruptive were tended to be prevalent in Developing Economies.
More recently, there has been renewed interest in the behavior of Gross Flows and the relationship between Gross and Net flows. Recent papers on the role of Gross capital flows in the determination Sudden Stops include Cowan and De Gregorio (2007) , Calder on and Kubota (2013), Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Alberola et al. (2012) . These papers focus on the determinants of such episodes and argue that Sudden Stops may be driven, among other factors, by external and country idiosyncratic factors and by the different behavior of residents and non-residents. In a different vein, Powell et al. (2002) argued that Gross Outflows and Inflows are strongly associated, that each may "Granger-cause" the other, and that there may be vicious and virtuous cycles between Gross capital flows and macroeconomic variables. For example, during periods of increasing financial integration, non-residents may buy domestic assets and residents are likely to use the proceeds to purchase assets abroad. During periods where financial integration has diminished the reverse may Table A .1 in the appendix for the list of countries included in each group. 2 Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) document the increased stocks of financial assets and liabilities. also occur. In other contributions, Cowan et al. (2008) and Broner et al. (2013) trace the movement of Gross Inflows and Outflows together with macroeconomic variables over episodes of Starts and Stops in Gross Flows. We depart from these previous contributions by proposing a new taxonomy of Sudden Stops. We then employ this taxonomy to explore the simultaneous roles of Gross Capital Inflows, Gross Capital Outflows and Net Flows to characterize different types of Sudden Stops. The taxonomy considers all logical combinations of Gross and Net Flows and hence we expand the set of episodes considered in previous studies, to include Sudden Stops in Gross Inflows and Sudden Starts in Gross Outflows that are not simultaneously Sudden Stops in Net Flows. We explore the behavior of key macroeconomic variables across different types of Sudden Stops according to the new taxonomy and find significant differences.
The increase in measured Gross Capital Flows shown in Fig. 1 may reflect changes in the type of flows as well as their quantity. For example, global banking may have increased cross-border flows, including those within individual global banks. Indeed, it is possible that enhanced financial integration has increased the share of those flows that are simply a wash in the financial account of the balance of payments and that do not affect Net Capital Flows at all; see Borio and Disyatat (2011) for a useful discussion. A possible benign interpretation of these phenomena is that most of these flows may represent an exchange of financial claims between residents and foreigners and generate offsetting Gross Flows, some of which may even be in some sense automatic. 3 In other words, to the extent that Gross Capital Outflows by residents increase to match Gross Capital Inflows by foreigners (or vice versa), then Net Flows may not be affected at all. Therefore, the rise in Gross Flowsdand their potential reversaldmay not necessarily increase the probability of a (net flow-type) Sudden Stop. 4 This notwithstanding, another strand of literature (i.e., Shin, 2012a,b, and Shin, 2012) has emphasized the potential disruptive nature of sudden reversals in Gross Capital Flows. This view is summarized in a report from the Committee on International Economic Policy Reform (2012), which underscored the potentially destabilizing role of debt-creating cross-border flowsdfor example, bank flowsdduring episodes of forced deleveraging. Similarly, Obstfeld (2012) argues that Gross Flows furnish the key conduit through which financial meltdown is transmitted and amplified across countries. 5 According to this view, Gross Flow reversals could still be disruptive, even with stable Net Capital Flows. This line of thought has broadened the scope of the Sudden Stop literature beyond the focus on Net Flows, and into the domain of the Advanced Economies; see Milesi-Ferreti and Tille (2011). 6 In this paper we shed light on this open debate by investigating the aftermath of various types of Net and Gross Sudden Stops for a large set of countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After presenting the new taxonomy in Section 2, we confront the data and detail the incidence of each type of episode across countries and time. In Section 3 we document how the distribution of the types of Sudden Stops has changed in Advanced Economies, compared to Developing Economies. Interestingly, we find greater similarities between Advanced and Developing Economies in the post-global financial crisis era. In Section 4, we consider the movement of macroeconomic variables, specifically real GDP growth and the real exchange rate, around the different 3 In the example of Borio and Disyatat (2011) , if a US resident decides to buy Japanese bonds, this transaction implies a gross outflow from the United States to be paid either: i) using the resident's existing stock of yen (i.e., thus reducing gross outflows from the United States by the same amount) or ii) by the resident selling dollars to a foreign bank in exchange for yen (which would result in an offsetting increase in gross inflows to the United States). In both cases, there is an automatic offsetting and no change in net flows. 4 Sudden Stops in Gross Capital Inflows to a country would not necessarily trigger a Sudden Stop of Net Capital Flows if Gross Capital Outflows adjusted accordingly. 5 Obstfeld (2012) argues that while the concept of Net Capital Flows deserves scrutiny by policymakers, it is not all that matters. At least as important are the gross two-way asset flows that underlie Net Flows because they could wreak havoc on financial stability. 6 Calvo (2013) conjectures that, just as the Eurozone deepened financial integration and gave rise to financial instruments that traveled in both directions (i.e., increased Gross Flows across countries), the crisis seriously interfered with financial integration as deposits in peripheral European countries stopped being perfect substitutes for deposits in German banks. In Calvo's view, this cycle of liquidity creation and destruction may be responsible for the financial fragilities revealed in recent crises.
types of Sudden Stop episodes. We construct statistical tests to show that some types of Sudden Stops appear to be more disruptive than others. In Section 5, we show that Sudden Stop episodes that are driven by bank flows are associated with larger output fall. We conclude with a discussion regarding potential implications for future research and policy.
A new taxonomy of Sudden Stops
As mentioned above, there has been considerable interest in the open economy macro financial literature regarding abrupt changes in capital flows, and the literature has tended to emphasize certain aspects during certain periods. During the 1980s the emphasis was on increases in capital flight or, in other words, on the Gross Outflows of residents. During the 1990s and early 2000s there was a focus on Sudden Stops in Net Flows that required significant current account adjustment. In recent years, there has been a return to the consideration of Gross Flows, in terms of "Sudden Stops" in Inflows, "Sudden Starts" of Outflows and other changes in capital flows such as "Surges" in Gross Inflows and "Retrenchment" of Outflows. 7 However, the literature to date has lacked a consistent framework or taxonomy regarding the sharp reductions in capital flows entering a country that combines Gross and Net Flows, and resident and non-resident considerations.
"Net Flows" in the financial account of the balance of payments are simply the net of Gross Inflows (i.e., net purchases of domestic assets by non-resident investors) and Gross Outflows (i.e., net purchases of foreign assets by resident investors). A Sudden Stop can be defined on the basis of Net Flows (for example, as some specified fall in Net Inflows relative to trend as in Calvo et al., 2004) or on the basis of Gross Flows (for example, a fall in Gross Inflows relative to the trend of Gross Inflows or an increase in Gross Outflows relative to the trend in Gross Outflows, as in Forbes and Warnock, 2012) . We therefore propose a new taxonomy of Sudden Stops that is illustrated in the Venn diagram of Fig. 2 .
Logically, then, there are seven potential types of Sudden Stops. Considering the very center of this figure an SSION is then separately a Sudden Stop in Inflows and a Sudden Start in Outflows, which together imply a Sudden Stop in Net Inflows. On the other hand, an SSI is a Sudden Stop in Inflows that does not imply a Sudden Stop in Net Flowsdwhich means it must be "financed" by a reduction in Outflows (or capital "repatriation" by resident investors). This implies non-residents sell substantial amounts of domestic assets but the purchases of these assets by residents are financed by a substantial sale of foreign assets on the part of residents. An SSO is a Start in Outflows that is not a Sudden Stop in Net Flows and hence must be "financed" by an increase in Inflows. So, residents purchase substantial amounts of foreign assets but at the same time non-residents purchase domestic assets. SSN is a Sudden Stop in Net Flows that is not a Sudden Stop in Inflows or a Sudden Start in Outflows; according to the precise empirical definitions developed below it is a milder reduction in Gross Inflows and increase in Gross Outflows such that it does not qualify as either a Sudden Stop or a Sudden Start, and yet the fall in Net Flows does qualify as a Sudden Stop; we return to the precise empirical definitions below. An SSIN is a Sudden Stop in Inflows that is also a Sudden Stop in Net Flows. In this case, nonresidents sell substantial amounts of domestic assets but the purchases of those assets by residents is not financed by the sale of foreign assets but rather by other means. SSON is a Sudden Start in Outflows that is also a Sudden Stop in Net Flows implying purchases of foreign assets by residents but with no substantial purchases of domestic assets by non-residents. Logically, an SSIO is a Sudden Stop in Inflows and a Sudden Start in Outflows that is not a Sudden Stop in Net Flows. However, while this may be a logical possibility, in practice it is unlikely to occur, and we find no such episodes in the data. We will disregard this last type of episode in what follows.
Relating this taxonomy to the literature, in the 1980s, given the concern with capital flight the focus was then on SSO-type episodes, although in general the literature did not distinguish between SSO, SSON and SSION. In the 1990s the focus shifted more to Sudden Stops in Net Flows. The definitions adopted tended to aggregate SSN, SSIN, SSON and SSION and hence did not distinguish between Net Flow Sudden Stops that were dominated by a fall in Inflows and those associated with an increase in Outflows. That said, additional filters were added that may have stressed more SSIN and SSION-type episodes. 8 In more recent papers, the role of Gross Inflows and Gross Outflows has been considered; see, for example, Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) . However, to date, while many papers have considered some of the types of episodes defined by this taxonomy or some unions of these different types of episodes, no paper to our knowledge has developed and considered the full taxonomy of Sudden Stop episodes as constructed here.
Considering the data and refining definitions

Data and definitions
In the balance of payments convention, Gross Capital Inflows are defined as the changes in the stock of international liabilities owed by residents. There are three subcomponents of Gross Capital Inflows: i) direct investment in the reporting economy; ii) portfolio investment liabilities (i.e., equities and bonds); and iii) other investment liabilities, which are primarily loans from non-resident banks. Gross Inflows can be either positive (i.e., a Capital Inflow to the reporting economy) or negative (i.e., a flow of capital from the reporting country to the rest of the world). 9 Similarly, Gross Capital Outflows are defined as changes in the stock of foreign asset holdings of residents. There are three subcomponents of Gross Capital Outflows: i) direct investment abroad; ii) portfolio investment assets; and iii) other investment assets, which are primarily offshore deposits of residents or cross-border loans from resident banks. An increase in foreign asset holdings of residents is a Capital Outflow in the balance of payments (i.e., it is recorded with a negative sign), while a 8 For example, Calvo et al. (2008) focused on "systemic sudden stops" where a Net Flow concept was employed but with an additional filter that the Sudden Stop was systemic. As we shall see below, that filter then tended to include more SSIN and SSION episodes and fewer SSON or SSN episodes. 9 It is perhaps confusing, but the concept of Gross Inflows is in fact the net changes in the position of non-residents in financial instruments that constitute liabilities of the reporting country, while Gross Outflows are the net changes in the position of residents in financial instruments that constitute assets of the reporting country. decrease in foreign asset holdings leads to capital repatriation (i.e., it is recorded with a positive sign). 10 Net Capital Flows are simply the Gross Capital Inflows plus the Gross Capital Outflows.
Net Flows ¼ Gross Inflows þ Gross Outflows
We collected data for all the countries with available information in the IMF-International Financial Statistics (IFS) database since the 1980s for all the subcomponents of Gross Capital Inflows and Outflows. Following Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) we annualize the quarterly data to avoid seasonality effects. In particular we define:
X tÀi;j c j ¼ 1; 2; 3 and t ¼ 1; 2; …; T where X t,1 ¼ Inflows, X t,2 ¼ Outflows and X t,3 ¼ Net Flows Next, we define the annual change in each of the series: DC t;j ¼ C t À C tÀ4 cj ¼ 1; 2; 3 and t ¼ 5; 6; …; T Following Forbes and Warnock (2012) we made some adjustments to the series using countryspecific data. 11 After these adjustments, we keep only those countries for which we have at least 10 years (40 quarters) of consecutive data. We end up with a sample of 63 countries À32 Developing and 31 Advanced according to the World Bank's standard categorizationd (see Table A .1 in the appendix for the full list of countries and time span of data coverage).
The next step is to define each type of Sudden Stop episode. In order to do so, we follow the algorithm described in Calvo et al. (2004) . In particular, taking each series separately, we define a Sudden Stop as an episode that begins when a series (DC i,j ) falls below one standard deviation of its cumulates international reserves, it is in essence accumulating foreign assets. However, in the balance of payment conventiondwhich we maintain in this paperdchanges in reserve assets holdings by the central bank are distinguished from Gross Capital Outflows, which are the changes in foreign assets holding of other residents. 11 As in Forbes and Warnock (2012) we introduced some additional modifications. First, in some cases IFS data do not differentiate well between missing values and zeros. In some cases we replaced dots with zeros. Finally, for Norway and the Slovak Republic, we completed some missing values in the middle of the sample with data found from the website of the national central banks.
historical mean (conditional that it subsequently falls below two standard deviations below the mean) and ends when the series exceeds one standard deviation below the mean. Fig. 3 below provides a graphical representation of the Calvo et al. algorithm. An innovation in this paper is that we apply this algorithm to each series: i.e., Gross Inflows, Gross Outflows and Net Flows, separately. This then allows us to distinguish the different types of Sudden Stop episodes as described in the previous section. We made two additional adjustments in order to avoid the inclusion of episodes that may not be associated with conditions of economic duress that are usually prevalent during Sudden Stops. First, we dropped episodes in which the change in either Gross or Net Flows occurred during a period of bonanza in the country's terms of trade. 12 An exogenous increase in the terms of trade may result in lower Capital Inflows (Gross and Net) due to the appearance of alternative sources of financing (i.e., a positive shock to the balance of payments). 13 Second, we also dropped episodes of Starts in Gross Outflows (SSO) where the capital outflow occurred concurrently with a significant increase in Net Capital Inflows. 14 The joint occurrence of the two events (i.e., an increase in Gross Outflows and an increase in Net Inflows) suggests that the surge in Gross Capital Outflows may simply reflect residents' responses to a significant increase in Gross Capital Inflows to the economy. These periods are thus likely related to a sharp increase in financial integration rather than incipient net flow-type sudden stops. 15 Fig. 4 summarizes the episodes found in our sample according to the taxonomy described above. There are a total of 285 episodes in the full sample (out of a total of 5798 country/quarter observations). The area of each set and each subset is consistent with the proportion of those types of episodes in the total. In particular, we find 96 SSO, 57 SSIN, 48 SSI, 37 SSON, 26 SSION and 21 SSN episodes in the dataset across all countries. As mentioned, we find zero SSIO episodes. 16 Fig. 4 . Sudden Stop episodes identified in the sample. 12 "Bonanza" in terms of trade in defined as an annual increase in the country's terms of trade of more than 4 percent, which is approximately the 75th percentile of the distribution of terms of trade changes in the entire sample. 13 With this filter we drop 103 episodes or 25 percent of the episodes in the sample. Notwithstanding this, the results we present in this paper are similar when we do not apply this filter (results available upon request). 14 We experiment with the precise definition of "significant." In the baseline case, we drop all episodes in which the increase in Net Flows was larger than 2 standard deviations above the mean. However, the results are robust when we use a more stringent threshold by dropping all episodes associated with any increase in Net Flows. 15 With this filter we drop 26 SSO episodes, which represent 21 percent of the SSO episodes in the unrestricted sample and 8.3 percent of total episodes. 16 The global financial crisis provoked a set of SSION events. However, there are also SSION events before and after the global financial crisis.
Episodes in the sample
There is also considerable bunching of Sudden Stop episodes at particular time periods. For example, the global financial crisis provoked a set of SSION events particularly in Advanced Economies; however, as shown in Table 1 , several of these types of episodes materialized before and after the global financial crisis. Table 2 details descriptive statistics regarding these episodes. The average durations are quite similar across the different types, from 2.3 to 3.5 quarters, but as can be seen, the mean changes in Inflows, Outflows and Net Flows (in terms of the standard deviation of the corresponding series) are different. As is to be expected, the Net Flow-type Sudden Stops (SSN, SSIN, SSON and SSION) have large changes in Net Flows (i.e., fall in net capital flows ranging between 2.36 and 4.33 standard deviations of Net Flows); however, the intensity of the variation in either Gross Inflows or Outflows varies by type of episode. The Sudden Stops in Inflows (SSI, SSIN, SSION) have large changes in Inflows (fall ranging between 2.77 and 3.88 standard deviations of Gross Inflows) while the Sudden Starts in Outflows (SSO, SSON) have large changes in Outflows (Starts in Gross Outflows ranging between 2.79 and 3.79 standard deviations of Gross Outflows). Overall, the SSION episodes display the largest changes in Gross and Net Capital Flows.
3.3. Sudden Stops in Advanced and in Developing Economies: how have they changed? Table 3 shows the incidence of different types of Sudden Stops in Advanced and Developing Economies; and within each group, the distribution of episodes across geographical regions (based on World Bank standard classification). There are more sudden stops of all types in Advanced Economies. Within the Advanced Economies group, the largest prevalence of episodes is in Europe and Central Asia. This is in part due to the fact that there are more countries available in this group. It is also the case that Advanced Economies have suffered from different types of Sudden Stops, with a higher incidence of Gross-Flow type episodes.
In the case of Developing Economies, the highest incidence of Sudden Stops is in Europe & Central Asia; East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. In all these cases, except for East Asia and the Pacific, Net-Flow Sudden Stops are relatively more frequent compared to Gross-Flow types. In order to explore the time series dimension in greater detail, in Figs. 5 and 6 we plot the Venn diagrams for Developing and Advanced Economies, pre-and post-2000, respectively.
These Venn diagrams illustrate a number of interesting facts. For Developing Economies pre-2000, the circles representing Sudden Stops in Inflows and Sudden Stops in Net Flows largely overlap; therefore, during this period the majority of Sudden Stops in Inflows were also Net Flows Sudden Stops. On the other hand, Sudden Starts of Outflows were not always Sudden Stops in Net Flows. In the post-2000 period these patterns changed. First, the incidence of Net Sudden Stops became more balanced between episodes that originated in sharp falls in Gross Capital Inflows, and those that originated in sudden starts in Gross Capital Outflows. Second, the frequency of "SSI" and "SSO" episodes increased, suggesting that there was more offsetting between Gross Outflows and Gross Inflows during this period.
In the case of Advanced Economies, pre-2000, there is very little overlap between the circles representing Sudden Stops in Inflows and Sudden Starts in Outflows, and the overlap with each of these circles and that representing a Sudden Stop in Net Flows is also less than that same overlap in the case of Developing Economies. This suggests that in this period Advanced Economies experienced more Gross Flow type episodes. Those Gross-Flow type episodes were financed within the capital account; i.e., they did not require a sharp adjustment in the current account. However, in the post-2000 period, particularly during the global financial crisis that started in 2008, this pattern changed: Advanced Economies suffered more Sudden Stops in Net Flows. In the post-2000 period it thus appears that Advanced Economies have become much more similar to Developing Economies in this regard. 17 Having explored the data in relation to the taxonomy of Sudden Stops, we now turn to the question of which Sudden Stops countries should be most concerned about. To address this question, we assess what happens to output and the real exchange rate in the aftermath of the different types of episodes.
Output and real exchange rate dynamics in the aftermath of Sudden Stops
There are several channels through which Sudden Stops may be disruptive when they materialize: they may dry up the external financing of the balance of payments forcing a large contraction in imports; they could force rapid deleveraging of the economic agents that have external debts; they could The increase in the frequency of net sudden stops in Advanced Economies in the 2000s came primarily at the expense of a lower frequency of SSO. In fact, while in the pre-2000 period 82 percent of the episodes in the "Outflows" circle were SSO, this share declined to 38 percent in the post-2000 period. In addition to this, there was also a significant increase in the share of "Inflows" episodes in the post-2000 period. In particular, the size of "Inflows" circle grew in the latter period as total share of "Inflows"-related episodes increased to 54 percent of the total in the post-2000 period from 40 percent in the pre-2000. Finally, out of the total "Inflows" episodes, a larger share was net Sudden Stops in the post-2000 period (57 percent) than in the pre-2000 period (37 percent).
precipitate a financial crisis. All these channels have been associated with output collapses. Moreover, Sudden Stops may entail real devaluations, as the affected countries have to adjust to a tighter financing constraint. 18 Therefore, in order to assess how disruptive Sudden Stops are, we focus on the behavior of output and of the real exchange rate in the aftermath of Sudden Stops.
Empirical strategy
We construct a simple statistical test to evaluate the macroeconomic impacts of different types of Sudden Stops. For every one of the 285 episodes in the sample, we set t ¼ 0 at the quarter when the Sudden Stop began. Subsequently, we explore the behavior of real GDP (quarterly, seasonally adjusted) 10 quarters before and 10 quarters after the beginning of the Sudden Stop. We do the same thing with the real effective exchange rate (RER, quarterly). In order to ensure comparability across countries and time periods, we index the country-specific series to 100 at t ¼ 0.
In the first approach, we compute the average of the indexed series across all the episodes that belong to the same type of Sudden Stop. Then, for each type of Sudden Stops, the statistical test consists of comparing the intercepts of the pre-and post-episode trends of the series, and evaluating if they are statistically different. As an example consider Fig. 7 which plots the average GDP and RER indices as described for those episodes classified as SSION; i.e., episodes when there are Sudden Stops in Inflows, Sudden Starts in Outflows and a Sudden Stop in Net Flows. Fig. 7 shows there was a significant decrease, on average, in real GDP beginning at t ¼ 0. The gap between the two trend lines is our measure of the (average) disruption in GDP associated with SSION episodes. Similarly, there was significant real exchange rate depreciation associated with SSION episodes. 19 The test is implemented for the different Sudden Stops in the context of a simple regression analysis. The regression specification follows directly from the examples presented in Fig. 7 . First, for each type of sudden stop (j), we regress:
where j indexes the type of Sudden Stop (i.e., SSI, SSO, etc.), RGDP (RER) is the average of the normalized real GDP (RER) series over the episode window (i.e., t-10 to tþ10). TREND (t) takes the values 1 to 21 over the episode window. SuddenStop j t is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 19 In the working paper version of this paper, Cavallo et al. (2013) , we report the same charts for the six types of episodes from the taxonomy separately.
during the quarters when there is a Sudden Stop of type j and zero otherwise (alternatively, we use a second indicator variable that takes the value 1 for all t ! 0 and zero otherwise). The coefficient estimates d ðg j Þdone per type of Sudden Stop computed in separate regressionsdprovide a quantitative measure of the estimated GDP (and RER) disruption in each case. Tables 4 and 5 report the results of estimating Equation (1) through OLS.
The results show that the impacts of Sudden Stops on real GDP and RER are heterogeneous across the different types of Sudden Stops. 20 For example, even though the Sudden Stop literature usually did not distinguish among Net Sudden Stops that originated in large drops in Gross Capital Inflows (i.e., SSIN episodes), large Starts in Gross Outflows (i.e., SSON episodes), large drops in Gross Inflows and large Starts in Outflows (i.e., SSION episodes), or mild drops in Gross Inflows together with mild Starts in Gross Outflows (i.e., SSN episodes), they all have different estimated impacts in terms of GDP: SSIN episodes, particularly SSION episodes, are associated with larger disruptions than SSON or SSN episodes. Interestingly, SSIN and SSION episodes are also associated with significant RER depreciationsdwhich is the main channel proposed by the literature to rationalize the output costs of Sudden Stops in Developing Economies; however, SSON and SSN episodes are not associated with significant RER depreciations despite the contraction in Net Capital Flows. 21 For SSI and SSO episodes, that is, episodes for which there is a significant drop in Capital Inflows (SSI episodes) or a Surge in Gross Capital Outflows (SSO episodes) that is offset by the other Gross flow, the impacts on GDP and RER are also different. In fact, in the case of SSI episodes there is a drop in GDP, and in the case of SSO episodes there is a mild increase in real GDP (and no significant effect on the RER). The smaller quantitative effect is a priori consistent with the tenets of the literature that has emphasized the disruptive role of Net rather than Gross Capital Flows. However, the fact that there is heterogeneity in the responses of GDP between SSI and SSO episodes suggests that the type of Gross Flows may also matter. In particular, SSI episodes are associated with drops in output while SSO Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 20 One potential concern with these results is that the underlying regression may be mis-specified. However, the spirit of this analysis is that of a simple test (illustrated in Fig. 7 ) to see if there is a significant break in the series in a short time window akin to an event study-like approach, we are not seeking here to explain the medium or long run behavior of the dependent variable. These do not show obvious specification problems. One specific concern might be that the high reported R2's come from the underlying regression and are not a result of the addition of the dummy but we verified that a substantially lower R2 results when the sudden stop dummy is removed. 21 This begs the question of why the real exchange failed to depreciate despite the fall in Net Capital Flows. There are at least two possibilities. First, on average these countries were not running current account deficits before the Sudden Stop (i.e., they had a balance of payments surplus). This is possible because in both cases we observe reserves were increasing before the Sudden Stop (results available upon request). Second, these episodes happen predominantly in more open economies, such that the real depreciation that is required in the aftermath of a Sudden Stop to restore external equilibrium is minimal. Cavallo (2006) shows that countries that are more open to trade have to engineer smaller real exchange rate depreciations in the aftermath of Sudden Stops. episodes are not. 22 Note as well that the output drop associated with SSIN episodes is statistically significant; while it is not significant in the case of SSON episodes. These differences suggest that there is something associated with fluctuations in Gross Capital Inflows which makes Gross and Net Inflowrelated episodes more disruptive than Starts in Gross Capital Outflows. As robustness checks, in a second approach conducted in the working paper version of this paper (Cavallo et al., 2013) , 23 instead of averaging across episodes, we pooled all the episodes by type of Sudden Stop (j). Thus, instead of having t ¼ 21 observations per regression as in the previous case, we have (t Â n j ) where n j ¼ number of episodes in each bucket j. Formally, for each type of Sudden Stop, we regressed: RGDP t;n ¼ a n þ bTRENDðtÞ þ g j Sudden Stop j t;n þ ε t;n
(2)
The method of estimation is OLS; we included fixed effects by episode, and the standard errors are clustered by type of episode. The advantage of equation (2) is that we gain greater power. In addition, by including fixed effects by episode (a n ) we control for unobservable characteristics that could bias the results of the test. We did the same using the RER as the dependent variable. Reassuringly, with both dependent variables the results obtained are consistent with the baseline.
In an additional set of regressions in the working paper version of this paper, we estimated a further variant of (2) where we also control for the size of the actual changes in the underlying gross and net flows (measured in terms of standard deviations). As explained before, there are some differences across types of episodes in terms of the magnitudes. Therefore, it could be that, for example, SSION events are associated with larger GDP disruptions than other episodes because they are the type of episodes with the largest variations in Capital Flows. In order to account for this, we test if the quantitative measure of the estimated GDP disruption (and RER), captured by the coefficient estimates ð b g j Þ, is robust after controlling by the size of the changes in Capital Flows. Formally, for each type of Sudden Stop we regressed: RGDP t;n ¼ a n þ bTRENDðtÞ þ g j Sudden Stop j t;n þ d i DKF i t;n þ ε t;n (3)
where DKF i t;n is the change in Capital Flow i ¼ Gross Inflows, Gross Outflows and Net Flows, respectively (we include all three simultaneously), measured in terms of standard deviations from the mean. We do not find significant changes to the baseline results. 24 In summary, the evidence that emerges from the regression results of Equation (1) ereported in Tables 4 and 5d and equations (2) to (3) available in the working paper versiond suggest two major regularities. First, as expected, only Sudden Stops in Net Capital Flows are associated with significant and robust impacts on the RER. However, somewhat puzzlingly, there are some types of Sudden Stops in Net Flows (i.e., SSON and SSN) that are not associated with RER depreciations. Second, in terms of GDP, there is also heterogeneity in the results, with Sudden Stops in Net Capital Flows being associated with larger disruption than Sudden Stops in Gross Flows. Moreover, Inflow-related episodes are associated with larger disruptions than Outflow-related episodes.
So far, we have estimated the regressions for each type of episode separately. Next, we estimate the same regressions pooling across all the episodes, adding a dummy for the type of episode. This permits 22 It is interesting to note that SSI episodes are also associated with statistically significant real exchange rate depreciations despite there being no significant change in net flows. However, as we will show below, this estimated effect is not robust across specifications. 23 The working paper version (Cavallo et al., 2013) is available through the Inter-American Development Bank's website (or from the authors upon request). The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) in Tables A.4eA .15 in the working paper version (for comparability, columns (1) and (2) in each table replicate the regressions in Tables 4 and 5). The results are broadly consistent. The only significant change is that in the case of SSI, the coefficient estimates for SSI d ðg SSI Þ for GDP and RER equations are no longer statistically significant. 24 Interestingly, controlling by the size of the changes in the Capital Flows, the coefficient estimates d ðg j Þ for SSI episodes are again negative and significant in the GDP equation as in the baseline regressions, but not in the RER equation. a set of additional tests on the estimated coefficients of interest. In this case we estimate three different models. The first is as follows: RGDP t;n;j ¼ a n þ bTRENDðtÞ þ gEpisode t;n;j þ ε t;n;j (4)
where Episode t,n,j takes the value 1 when there is a Sudden Stop of any type j within the window t. Therefore, using a pooling model, we estimate the average impact (g) of all the different types of Sudden Stops. We also estimate another variant where we control for the size of the change in the underlying capital flows: RGDP t;n;j ¼ a n þ bTRENDðtÞ þ gEpisode t;n;j þ d i DKF i t;n;j þ ε t;n;j (5) Finally, we estimate Equations (4) And (5) but allowing a different coefficient b g j for each type of Sudden Stop. Formally, we estimate: RGDP t;n;j ¼ a n þ bTRENDðtÞ þ g j Episode t;n;j þ ε t;n;j (6) and RGDP t;n;j ¼ a n þ bTRENDðtÞ þ g j Episode t;n;j þ d i DKF i t;n;j þ ε t;n;j
In all cases the estimation is done by pooled OLS, including episode fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by episodes. For concreteness we focus only on the results for GDP. 25 In Table 6 , Columns (a) and (b) correspond to the results of the estimation of equation (4); columns (c) and (d) are the results of the estimation of equation (5); columns (e) and (g) correspond to equation (6); and finally columns (f) and (h) correspond to the results of equation (7).
The first four columns show that, on average, Sudden Stop episodes are associated with output falls. Taking the estimates in column (a) for example, we find that on average Sudden Stops are associated with a fall in real GDP of some 0.81 percent. Allowing for different coefficient estimates for each type of episode , columns (e) to (h), we find that the effects are heterogeneous. In particular, we find that SSION and SSIN-type Sudden Stops are associated with significant disruptions, but this is not the case across all different types of Sudden Stops. The coefficient estimates b g j range from zero (i.e., not statically significant) in the cases of SSO, SSON and SSN, to negative and highly significant in the case of SSION. According to these results, SSION Sudden Stops are associated with falls in real GDP of between 1.5 percent and 3.3 percent of GDP on average. SSI and SSIN episodes are associated with lower disruptions, and SSO events are associated with GDP increases, although they are not always significant.
Using the results from the pooled regressions, we can formally test the difference between the coefficient estimates. In particular, we test the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates b g j for each type of sudden stop are equal. Table 7 reports the results corresponding to the regression in column (f) of Table 6 :
The results suggest that the rank order of episodes from least to more disruptive in terms of GDP is:
SSION episodes are found to be the most disruptive type of sudden stop, followed by SSIN. According to Table 7 , the coefficient estimates are statistically different for the two types of Sudden Stops; therefore we use the symbol "<" to order them. Next, SSI, SSN and SSON events are associated with Table 7 Wald-test of the equality of coefficent estimates.
F statistic of Wald test applied to coefficient estimates of column (f) in Null Hypothesis: Coefficients are equal. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 25 The working paper version also includes results using only a balanced panel from 1998 to 2010. This reduces the sample by 12 countries (almost 20% of countries in the sample), leaving only a sample of countries that have the complete data during the period. All the main results highlighted in the paper hold. This indicates that the results are robust to such changes in the sample.
Table 8
The estimated effect of different types of Sudden Stops: Advanced economies. Table 9 The estimated effect of different types of Sudden Stops: Developing economies. lower GDP declines than the other two. However, the test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal for these three types of Sudden Stops; therefore, we use the symbol " " between them. Finally, we find that SSO episodes are associated with increases in real GDP; therefore they are the least disruptive of all. It is interesting to consider why, when both do not imply a necessary adjustment of the real exchange rate, SSI type Sudden-Stops are more disruptive than SSO Sudden Stops; indeed the latter are not disruptive at all. In fact this is quite logical, an SSI implies a substantial sale of domestic assets by non-residents, which surely has very different (and likely more disruptive) effects than substantial purchases of foreign assets on the part of residents that might be financed in many ways. A sharp sale of domestic assets by non-residents has impacts on domestic leverage or deleterious liquidity effects on resident firms and households reducing real economic activity. 26 Depending on how the purchases of foreign assets are financed, the transactions that lie behind SSO type events may not be disruptive at all. Moreover, if SSO's are driven by new international opportunities, rather than domestic problems, they could even be positive for domestic agents.
Macroeconomic impact in Advanced and Developing Economies
In this section we explore whether the estimated impacts of Sudden Stops are different between Advanced and Developing Economies. It may be that Advanced Economies can be hit by Sudden Stops, but that these are less disruptive than in Developing Economies. For concreteness we report in Tables 8  and 9 only the results corresponding to Equation (1) and for real GDP as the dependent variable. However, the resultsdavailable upon requestdare robust across the various specifications.
We find that the estimated impacts are qualitatively similar in both cases, confirming that Sudden Stops should not only be a source of concern for Developing Economies; this notwithstanding, the quantitative effects are significantly larger on Developing Economies, with some variation depending on the type of Sudden Stop.
Which flows are the most disruptive?
It is possible that the composition of flows also matters for the impacts of Sudden Stops. This point has been stressed in the literature that has emphasized the potentially destabilizing role of Gross Capital Flows. 27 In particular, bank flows could be potentially more disruptive for financial stability than pure portfolio flows, or even FDI. The former may lead to forced and economically disruptive deleveraging in the context of a Sudden Stop.
In order to test whether certain types of flows are more disruptive than others, we aggregate the episodes by the subtype of flow that accounted for the largest share of the change. Therefore, for each of the 285 episodes in the sample, we assess which of the subcomponents of the Capital Flows (i.e., Table 10 Distribution of different types of sudden stops by subtype of flow.
Gross outflows
Gross inflows Net 1  19  3  2  21  4  0  22  26  Total  30  14  115  23  15  93  40  13  88  285 portfolio, foreign direct investment or other investments) accounted for the largest share of the change during the episode. For example, in the case of SSI episodes, we distinguish among episodes in which the fall in Gross Capital Inflows was predominantly driven by: i) direct investment in the reporting economy (DIR); ii) portfolio investment liabilities (PIL); and iii) other investment liabilities (OIL), which are primarily loans from non-resident banks. In the case of Sudden Stops that were associated with Capital Outflows (SSO), we distinguish among episodes in which the surge was predominately explained by: i) direct investment abroad (DIA); ii) portfolio investment assets (PIA); and iii) other investment assets (OIA), which are primarily offshore deposits of residents or cross-border loans from resident banks. Finally, in the cases of Sudden Stops in Net Capital Flows, like SSIN, SSON, and SSION, in addition to separating the episodes by the underlying behavior of either Gross Inflows or Outflows, respectively, we also distinguish among the episodes in which the fall in Net Flows was explained by: i) net direct investment (DIN); ii) net portfolio investment (PIN); and iii) net other investment (OIN). Table 10 shows how each of the episodes is allocated within each bucket. For example, according to the table, there are 30 episodes in which the dominant flow driving the Sudden Stop was "portfolio investment assets" (PIA): 14 of these were SSO episodes; 10 were SSON episodes, and 6 were SSION episodes. There are 14 episodes in which the dominant flow was "direct investment assets" (DIA), and so on for each subcomponent of flows.
It stands out from the table that the episodes associated with changes in "other investments"dboth assets (OIA), liabilities (OIL) and net (OIN)daccount for the largest share of all episodes across all types of Sudden Stops.
Next, we assess the estimated impacts of each type of episodes on real GDP. The results in Table 11 suggest that the episodes in which the predominant component was "other investment" are the most disruptive. In fact, in the cases of episodes driven by portfolio investments in particular, we do not find statistically significant disruptions in the aftermath of Sudden Stops. These results support the hypothesis that the composition of capital flows also matters. Irrespective of type, Sudden Stops that are predominantly driven by variations in "other investments" appear to be the most disruptive.
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a new taxonomy of Sudden Stops. This framework integrates many of the varied contributions in the Sudden Stops literature and allows the researcher to then consider the different effects of different types of Sudden Stops, characterized by the behavior of Gross Capital Inflows and Outflows and Net Flows. Within that taxonomy two particular strands of the Sudden Stop literature can be identified as follows.
The Net Flows View: This perspective emphasizes the potentially destabilizing role of abrupt falls in Net Capital Inflows. Sudden reversals in Net Capital Flowsdirrespective of their origindare frequently associated with real exchange rate depreciations and current account adjustments, which may be highly disruptive and provoke slowdowns in growth or even recession.
The Gross Flows View: the focus here is on the role of Gross Capital Flows, in particular debt-creating flows like cross-border bank flows. Abrupt reversals in Gross Flows may be disruptivedin terms of output lossdeven if they are not associated with an abrupt fall in Net Capital Inflowsdbecause forced deleveraging in a short space of time can be destabilizing.
The taxonomy developed above illustrates how these two views may be distinct (SSI or SSO episodes versus Net flow episodes) or overlapping (SSIN, SSON and SSION episodes) . The literature to date has tended to focus on Sudden Stops in Net Flows (without always recognizing that some of those episodes might also be Sudden Stops in Gross Inflows or Sudden Starts in Gross Outflows) or abrupt changes in Gross Flows (without always recognizing that some of those may have an impact on Net Flows and some may not).
The Net Flows View, which proliferated in the aftermath of the crises in emerging markets in the 1990s, focused almost exclusively on a subset of Developing Economies (the so-called Emerging Economies). These were the countries that were perceived to be most vulnerable to Sudden Stops. However, the data analysis shows that Advanced Economies have also been susceptible to Sudden Stops. Before the global financial crisis, Advanced Economies suffered more from Gross Flow-type Table 11 The estimated effect of different types of Sudden Stops on real GDP by subtype of flow. Sudden Stops and had relatively few Net Flow-type Sudden Stops. While there were several periods of sharp declines in the stocks of liabilities (Gross Inflow Sudden Stops), these tended to be "financed" by capital repatriation from resident investors. The crisis, however, both Gross and Net Flow-type Sudden Stops in Advanced and in Developing Economies. In the current global environment the differences between Developing and Advanced Economies appears to have narrowed. Capital flows in Advanced Economies have become more volatile, and Advanced Economies seem to be more prone now to Sudden Stops in Net Capital Flows as well as Sudden Stops of the Gross Flow variety. It would appear that all countries may now wish to consider how to protect themselves against the deleterious effects of Net Flow and Gross Flow-type Sudden Stops. Employing the taxonomy of Sudden Stops we have uncovered some interesting features in relation to the aftermath of different types of Sudden Stops. In particular, we have shown that: i) some Sudden Stops of Net Capital Flows are associated to larger disruptions than others; ii) episodes that are Sudden Stops in Net Capital Flows tend to be associated with larger declines in GDP; iii) episodes associated with drops in Gross Capital Inflows seem to be more disruptive than episodes associated with Starts in Gross Capital Outflows; and iv) some types of flows (i.e., bank flows) appear to be more disruptive than others. Taking altogether, Sudden Stops that combine falls in Net Flows and that are driven by an abrupt reduction in bank inflows appear to be the most disruptive combination.
Our results also raise a few puzzles and suggest new avenues for research and future policy analysis. For example, it is not clear why a Sudden Start in Outflows that was also a Net Flow Sudden Stop (i.e., SSON) would not be associated with a significant real depreciation and it could be less disruptive than a Sudden Stop in Inflows that was also a Net Flow-type Sudden Stop (i.e., SSIN). One answer might be that such periods of capital flight tend to be financed by a fall in reserves, but that in turn begs the question of why that would be the case: if a Sudden Stop in Capital Inflows that was also a Net Flow Sudden Stop is disruptive, why would countries not attempt to "finance" those Sudden Stops through reserve reduction? Future work might also consider movements in reserves, again employing the taxonomy developed above to attempt to answer this question.
The answer may also relate to how reserves might be used to ameliorate the costs of Sudden Stops. On the one hand, a significant buffer of reserves might be preventative in nature and give investors more confidence in maintaining investments in the country under consideration. But if the Sudden Stop does occur, a question is how reserves might be used most effectively to reduce economic disruption. Have countries found more effective ways to use reserves for Sudden Starts in Outflows compared to Sudden Stops in Inflows, and if so, what are these mechanisms?
Apart from having a large buffer of reserves, many Developing Economies have also attempted to improve their balance sheets by lengthening sovereign debt maturities, issuing more debt locally and in local currency and, in general, reducing currency or maturity mismatches. An interesting topic for future research is how such advances might reduce the costs of different types of Sudden Stops. The data show that not all Sudden Stops, even of the same type, incur the same costs. For those most painful of Sudden Stops (SSION and SSIN), does improvement in balance sheets reduce economic disruption? Recent papers have indicated that emerging economy sovereigns have been paying higher effective ex post interest costs issuing debt locally, compared to interest rates paid on external debt in dollars. 28 One interpretation is that countries have been buying insurance against Sudden Stops. Has this been effective, and if so, has it been effective for all types of painful Sudden Stops or only some types? One concern, for example, is that while emerging economy sovereign balance sheets have improved, private balance sheets may actually have deteriorated in the sense that booming non-tradable sectors in countries that are large recipients of capital inflows (several of which are also commodity exporters) may have been issuing significant amounts of foreign currency debt.
Another question that emerges from the preceding analysis is why are Sudden Stops in Inflows are more disruptive than Sudden Starts in Outflows? This is true for both Gross Flows episodes only (i.e., SSI versus SSO) and for Net episodes (SSIN versus SSON). We can rationalize these findings by 28 See Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) on the costs of domestic versus external debt in emerging economies, comparing the last decade with previous periods. considering the transactions underlying the different types of Sudden Stops. A Sudden Stop in Gross Inflows implies the sudden sale of domestic assets on the part of non-residents which might imply deleveraging or negative liquidity effects in domestic markets and for domestic firms and households with impacts on real activity. On the other hand, a Sudden Start in Outflows implies a sudden purchase of foreign assets on the part of domestic residents that might be financed in many different and, perhaps non-disruptive, ways. Indeed if such sudden foreign asset purchases are driven more by international opportunities than domestic problems it might constitute a net positive for the domestic economy. Also, it may be that countries have found more effective ways to backstop abrupt changes in the stock of foreign asset holdings of residents (i.e., through controls on capital outflows) than to have access to external liquidity sources to finance an abrupt reduction in Gross Capital Inflows. Perhaps more importantly, the distinction between Inflows and Outflows underscores the importance of international liquidity assistance via an international lender of last resort, particularly during episodes of Sudden Stops in Inflows. 29 The taxonomy and data analysis also underscores that Sudden Stops are not only a phenomenon pertaining to Developing Economies. Our results may help to explain why the impacts of the global financial crisis have been so pervasive in economies that were not previously considered to be at high risk of Net Flow-type Sudden Stops. It seems that several Advanced Economies suffered Net Flow-type Sudden Stops, hence it may be necessary for them to make significant real exchange rate adjustments to adjust to the reality of lower Net Capital Inflows. They may also need to take precautions against the potential consequences of a Gross Flow Sudden Stop and its counterpart of deleveraging. How Advanced Economies can protect themselves in the future against such episodes at minimum cost is surely also a critical topic of future research.
We hope that the new taxonomy serves as an organizing framework which can be taken to deepen the analysis on the macroeconomic impacts of different types of shocks. We have uncovered heterogeneity amongst the different types of Sudden Stops; further research is required, however, to pin down the exact sources and defining characteristics of that heterogeneity. 
